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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in deciding whether a government enact-
ment that restricts the use or decreases the value of property amounts
to a violation of a constitutional right, focuses on the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which declares that private property shall
not "be taken for public use, without just compensation."' This limi-
tation on government applies to states by virtue of its incorporation
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.!
In deciding whether a government regulation amounts to a taking
of property, the Court appeals to a variety of considerations: does the
government regulation amount to a physical confiscation," does it
leave the property owner with economically viable use of the prop-
erty,4 was the regulation enacted to prevent a noxious use of prop-
erty,' does the regulation unfairly single out some people and force
them to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole,"
do the benefits of the regulation outweigh the detriment to the
property owner,' and is the regulation necessary to effect a substantial
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' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause requires compensation for pri-ate property taken by states
for Vublic use).
E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1014-15 (1992); Yee v. Cit) of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATY Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 427-28 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 10-4. 125-26 (1978);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946).
4 E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980); Penn Cent. Tramp.. 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
5 E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. 668-69 (1887). Set generaly Keytone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987).
6 E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Pa. Coal Co. %. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922).
7 E.g., Loreto, 458 U.S. at 436; Kaiser Atena v. United States, 4,14 U.S. 164 (1979); Pa. Coa,
260 U.S. at 414.
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public purpose.8 While all of these considerations may be relevant in
deciding whether it is good morally or as a matter of public policy to
allow the government to restrict the use of property without paying
just compensation, the Court has never made clear why all of these
considerations are relevant to the Takings Clause, the plain meaning
of which requires only that government must not "take"-grasp,
seize, lay hold of-property without paying compensation, not that its
regulations must be fair or promote a sufficiently justified purpose.
Without an account of why these considerations are relevant in decid-
ing the constitutional issue, the Court's various appeals will remain"ad hoc," a description the Court itself has used to characterize prop-
erty rights adjudication. 9
The plain meaning of "do not take property" is not "do not regu-
late unfairly" or "do not fail to promote social utility," and the Court
has never shown that the Framers of either the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments understood "do not take property" in any way other
than the plain meaning.' The Court's takings analysis has lacked
8 E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 834 (1986); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 127.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 ("[N]o 'set formula' exist[s] to determine, in all cases, whether
compensation is constitutionally due for a government restriction of property. Ordinarily, the
Court must engage in 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438
U.S. at 124)).
t0 Records of what the Founders intended by the specific language of the Takings Clause are
scarce. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship
Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL L. REV. 267, 283 (1988) ('IT]he
clause was one of the least controversial provisions in the Bill of Rights, occasioning no re-
corded substantive comment at all."). James Madison seems to have meant the Clause to apply
only to direct, physical takings of property. In a speech from June 9, 1789, proposing texts of
early amendments to the Constitution, Madison suggested the following formulation of the
Takings Clause: "No person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be nec-
essary for public use, without ajust compensation." Amendments to the Constitution (June 8,
1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 201 (Charles F. Hobson et. al. eds., 1979) (emphasis
added). No account seems to exist as to why the change in language was made from "relin-
quish" to "take." William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 n.95 (1985) ("The accounts of
the congressional debate over the Bill of Rights provide no evidence as to why the change in
language was made."). Treanor argues that Madison intended the Takings Clause to provide
narrow legal protection against direct physical takings, but also to serve at least symbolically a
broader educative function, providing a moral protection for property. Id. at 711-12. Both Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Blackmun seem to agree that Madison meant the Takings Clause to offer
legal protection only to direct, physical takings. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1028 n.15 (1992); id. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Cf.J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory
Takings and "Judicial Supremacy, "51 ALA. L. REV. 949, 955 (2000) ("Historical research has estab-
lished beyond reasonable dispute that the Framers intended the Clause only to apply to physical
seizures."); Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause-"Poor Relation" No More? 47 OKLA. L. REV. 4117,
419-21 (1994) (stating that according to the original understanding of the Takings Clause, a
taking was an appropriation or acquisition of property). For a contrary reading of Madison's
understanding of the Takings Clause, see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent:
The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far, "49 Am. U. L. REV. 181 (1999) (arguing that for
Madison and the Founders, takings originally included nonphysical regulatory takings of prop-
erty). For criticism of Gold's position, see infra note 41. For discussion of why Madison's views
are uniquely important when examining the intentions behind the amendments, see Jack
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moorings to the text of the Constitution, giving the impression that it
has been guided by the Court's ideas of what the scope of property
rights ought to be' rather than by what the text of the Constitution
requires either in its plain meaning or according to the intent of the
Framers or an understanding of its implicit principles."
A principled and textually grounded basis for deciding the scope
of property rights afforded by the Constitution will require the Su-
preme Court to recognize that there are, not one, but three distinct
provisions protecting property rights. In addition to the Takings
Clause, there are the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, both of which prohibit governments from deprihing
any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Many of the considerations weighed by the Court in its takings adju-
dication are irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and
some of these considerations can be grounded only in one of the Due
Process Clauses. The Due Process Clauses themselves are, through a
long line of cases, interpreted narrowly or broadly depending on
what level of judicial review-minimal, heightened, or strict-the
Court finds appropriate. 4 In its failure to link the considerations that
it weighs in its property rights adjudication to the appropriate consti-
tutional provisions, the Court creates a takings jurisprudence that is
unprincipled and ad hoc. 5 By decoupling the Takings and Due Pro-
Rakove, Parchment Bariers and the Politics of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS 98, 12426 (Michael
J. Lacey & Knud Haakunssen eds., 1991).
n See Byrne, supra note 10 (arguing that the expansive reading of the Takings Clause is an
example ofjudicial overreaching).
" See genera/ly ERWN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING TIlE CONSTnTION (1987) (providing an
overview of a variety of approaches to interpreting the Constitution).
s U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
14 Economic legislation receives minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (holding that economic regulations are presumed
constitutional unless arbitrary and irrational); Ferguson v. Skrupa. 372 U.S. 726. 729-32 (1963)
(stating that the Due Process Clause is no longer used to strike down laws felt to be *economi-
cally unwise"); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that regulations of
business and industrial conditions need only have a rational relation to the state's objective);
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (stating that the Court defers to Congress and states
regarding the wisdom or appropriateness of economic regulations); Nebbia v. New York. 291
U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that a law regulating milk prices is consistent uith due process if it is
not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious). Legislation impinging on fundamental rights re-
ceives stricter scrutiny. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking down a state
abortion law as a violation of the fundamental right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969) (striking down, under the Equal Protection Clause, a welfare residency re-
quirement as a violation of the fundamental right to travel interstate); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (striking down a state's contraception law as violating the funda-
mental right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking do;wni, under
the Equal Protection Clause, a state criminal sterilization statute as a violation of the findame n-
tal right to procreate).
15 Commentators andjudges have noted the failure to distinguish the Takings and Due Pro-
cess Clauses. In Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1036 (Cal. 1999),Jus-
tice Chin, dissenting, criticized the majority for citing Due Process Clause cases in a Takings
Clause case and argued that the two clauses should be separated, but he gave no indication of
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cess Clauses and identifying which Clause provides the anchor for
each of its considerations, the Court's rulings on property rights can
be made coherent. More importantly from a practical perspective, by
properly linking each consideration to the appropriate textual provi-
sion, we can remove some of the ambiguities in the principles and
tests that the Court formulates based on these considerations.
In Part II, I discuss the three clauses providing federal constitu-
tional protection to property owners and explain the issue that the
Court faces in confronting cases involving property rights-whether a
regulation amounts to a taking. Part III examines the Court's various
considerations in deciding whether a regulation amounts to a taking
and explains how decoupling the Takings Clause from the Due Proc-
ess Clauses provides a principled, nonarbitrary justification for giving
these considerations any weight.
I. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
A. The Three Clauses: An Overview
At the constitutional convention, the individual states agreed both
to establish a federal government with certain enumerated powers
and, at the same time, to limit those powers.'6 One such limit was a
restriction on what the federal government could do with private
property. The states wrote into the Constitution express protectionsfor property that the federal government is bound to respect as part
of the compact through which it was established. With the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the states expressly agreed to limit their
own powers by prohibiting themselves from enacting laws denying
life, liberty, or property Without due process of law.
When considering whether a state or federal regulation amounts
to an unconstitutional usurpation of property rights, the Court has
the distinct rationales for each clause. Glen E. Summers singles out three current takings tests--
the public use limitation, the balancing test, and the substantial relations test-claiming theyare appropriate only to a due process analysis. Glen E. Summers, Comment, Private Property
Without Lochner: Toward a TakingsJurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA.L. REv. 837 (1993). StevenJ. Eagle argues for distinguishing Takings and Due Process Clauses
for the sake of coherence. StevenJ. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reap-praisa4 51 ALA. L. REv. 977, 1005, 1009 (2000). Agreeing that it is helpful to decouple the Tak-
ings and Due Process Clauses, this Article advances this contention by providing a more system-
atic discussion that links all of the primary considerations currently used in Takings
jurisprudence with the meaning and purposes of each clause. This Article takes issue with sev-
eral of Eagle's conclusions, see infra note 131, and where Summers would banish the balancingand substantial relations tests, this Article attempts to show how these and other tests used by
the Court can be applied more coherently once they are properly associated with their constitti-
tional moorings.
16 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324-26 (1816); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779,
847 (1995) (Thomas,J., dissenting).U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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generally appealed to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
"
While the Takings Clause was originally intended as a limitation only
on the federal government, Justice John M. Harlan held in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad. Co. v. Chicago that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings
Clause, thereby applying it to the states. "
Since the argument in this Article depends on an appreciation of
the distinct protections afforded by the Takings Clause and the Due
Process Clause, it is useful to consider what protections against state
regulations would be left to property owners under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if Justice Harlan's dicta-that
a taking of property without just compensation is, necessarily and al-
ways, a deprivation of property without due process of law-had not
been followed by later Courts "& and the Takings Clause never incor-
porated.
Since the revolt against Lochner v. New YorP' and its perceived use
of strict scrutiny to strike down economic legislation as a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law, the Court has given deference
to legislatures and used only minimal scrutiny to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of economic regulations." If the Court interprets a state
regulation of private property as essentially economic legislation, it
will uphold the regulation as long as it is not wholly arbitrary, and
thus, if the Takings Clause had never been incorporated, such a regu-
lation would be valid, even if it "takes" property ithout providing
just compensation. Only upon the theory of substantive due process
18 Cases in the early part of the 1900s involving regulations of property did appeal to the
Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). and some cases invoked
both the Due Process and Takings Clauses, se eg., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922). One commentator has argued that after the demise of substantive due process re-
views of economic legislation with the rejection of Lohntr in the 1930s, the Takings Clause
"gradually emerged as the only remaining tool for invalidating regulations which interfered
with property rights." Summers, supra note 15, at 845. Recently, courts hare returned to the
Due Process Clause as a possible source for property protections. See e.g.. E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498 (1998) (considering whether the Coal Act, which retroactively allocates liability to
Eastern Enterprises for health benefits to its former employees, constitutes a taking or a viola-
tion of substantive due process; five Justices found that the Coal Act is invalid= four Justices
found it to be an unconstitutional taking, five justices found the Taking Clause to be inapplica-
ble, and one Justice found the Act to violate the Due Process Clause); Kavazau v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997) (denyingjust compensation for rental income lost
due to a rent control law, on the grounds that the lav was a violation of due process but not of
the Takings Clause and that just compensation is not the appropriate remedy for due process
violations); Kavanua v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 19 Cal. App. 4th 730 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that a 12 percent limit on rent increases deprived Kavanau of a 'just and rea-
sonable return" in violation of his due process rights).
19 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897) (holding that "[c]ompensation for private property taken for
public use is an essential element of due process of law as ordained by the fourteenth amend-
ment").
"0 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) ('[The Fifth
Amendment] of course is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Ansendment.").
21 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22 See cases cited supra note 14.
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would it be a permissible exercise of judicial review to strike down as
a violation of the Due Process Clause an entirely arbitrary economic
regulation that satisfied the requirements of procedural due proc-
ess.
In Lochner a majority of the Court struck down that part of a New
York state regulation that limited the number of hours a baker could
work." The Court held that the law exceeded the state's police pow-
ers by limiting bakers' liberty to contract in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.25 The Court gave no indi-
cation that the law failed to meet the requirements of procedural due
process: the law presumably was the product of due procedures for
lawmaking, it was not vague, and it required notification to those ac-
cused of its violation ; Nevertheless, the Court struck down the law
on the ground that it failed to meet the demands of, not procedural,
but substantive due process.
Under the Court's substantive due process analysis, a law that de-
nies a person life, liberty, or property must be adequately justified,
regardless of whether that law is enacted according to scrupulously
fair and proper democratic procedures. The degree of justification
required depends on the liberty interest effected. In contrast, where
the law is an economic regulation that does not deny people equal
protection of the laws or violate fundamental rights, courts now use
minimal scrutiny, demanding only that the law not be arbitrary or ca-
pricious.' While this is a fairly lax standard, it has been used to strike
25 Procedural due process has been regarded as requiring certain safeguards, such as the
"right to be heard" and notice requirements. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case.'") (citation omitted); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (hearing re-
quired); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870) (right to notification and
a hearing); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863) (same).
2 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 53 ("The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of theliberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.")
(citation omitted).
26 Cf Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (reversing conviction for violation of law
found to be vague); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914) (stating that the "fundamen-
tal principles ofjustice embraced in the conception of due process of law" are violated if a stat-
ute compels "men on peril of indictment to guess what their goods would have brought tinder
other conditions not ascertainable").
27 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46 ("If, in the opinion of the factory inspector, alterations are re-
quired in or upon premises occupied and used as bakeries, in order to comply with the provi-
sions of this article, a written notice shall be served by him upon the owner, agent or lessee of
such premises, either personally or by mail, requiring such alterations to be made within sixty
days after such service, and such alterations shall be made accordingly." (quoting N.Y. Livs,
1897, ch. 415, § 115)).
28 Where a right is regarded as fundamental, such as the right to travel or the right to pri-
vacy, then a law infringing on this right demands greaterjustification. See cases cited supra note
14.
29 See cases cited supra note 14.
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down legislation.' Many readers of the Lochner opinion assume that
the Court used strict scrutiny to strike down the New York law,
0' but
while its language is unclear and sometimes conflicting, a strong case
can be made that the Court struck down the New York law using only
minimal scrutiny. The Court found the law to have "no reasonable
foundation" and to be "arbitrary. 
"s2
Had the Court never held that the Takings Clause applies to states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, state regulations of private
property would be permissible-even if they took property-so long
as they were not arbitrary or capricious, assuming that, as economic
regulations, they would be evaluated under minimal scrutiny. Even if
the right to own property were held to be fundamental," such regula-
so See City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (using rational bsis test
to strike down law as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); cf. Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 324
U.S. 498, 550 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (striking down the Coal
Act using a "permissive" standard); Eagle, supra note 15, at 1026 (arguing that even a rational
basis test requires making substantive evaluations about legislative goals).
, E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNmTIrnTrONAL LAW 1346 (3d ed. 2000) Liehier
itself provides the best example of such strict and skeptical means-ends anal)Sis.-).
s2 Lodhner, 198 U.S. at 58 ("There is, in ourjudgment, no reasonable foundation for holding
this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law."); iL at 62 (-[The law] is unreasonable and
entirely arbitrary."); id. at 57 (declaring that "there is no reasonable ground" for the law and
that "the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate"). The first of these quotations reveals
just how unclear and conflicting the Court's opinion is. It conflates a law that is not "necessan-
with a law that is not "appropriate" and later with a law that is "entirely arbitrary." In the same
opinion the Court in fact invokes both minimal and strict scrutiny. The opinion notes that
there are alternatives to the law, such as inspecting baking premises. Despite such instances of
stricter scrutiny, numerous passages reveal that the Court concludes that the law is not only un-
necessary, but arbitrary, capricious, and irrational. It seems to me the most compelling criti-
cism of the Lochner decision should focus not on its use of substantive due process but on its
assessment of whether the law is "arbitrary." The deepest flaw in the Court's decision is not its
use of "subjective values" to strike down the will of the majority but its failed use of an objectise
standard of reasonableness. Even if the law resulted from pressure by unions opposed to cheap.
exploitable immigrant labor, the law is not arbitrary.
33 Relying primarily on the Takings Clause to protect property rights. the Court has not
treated property as a "fundamental right" for the purpose of due process analssis. This is not to
say that property is not regarded as important. The Founders, philosophers influencing them,
and early state court decisions invoke the language of "natural" and "inalienable" right to char-
acterize property. See Gold, supra note 10. But the Supreme Court's recent consideration of
the scope of protection to property accorded by the Due Process Clause in Eastnr Enteprpns t:
Apfe4 524 U.S. 498 (1998), appears to indicate a reluctance to use strict scrutim in a due proc-
ess review of regulations affecting property. Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion, ex-
presses concern "about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation." Id. at
537. Cf. Byrne, supra note 10, at 954 ("[R]egulatory takings sometimes seems to be the very
same doctrine as substantive due process, attached to a different clause only as an alias to avoid
the obloquy in which substantive due process is held."). It is important to note that the fivejus-
tices who do use the Due Process Clause employ a deferential standard of review. See E. Enter.,
524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); :d. at 533
(Stevens,J., with whom Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, IJ.,join. dissenting,), id. at. 556 (Breer,
J., with whom Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., join, dissenting). However, we cannot infer
from this that they would not treat property as a fundamental right were the Due Process Clause
the only protection afforded to property. These five Justices invoke the Due Process Clause
only because they do not think the law in question threatens a genuine propcrtv interest. For
example, Justice Breyer characterizes the retroactive law in question as affecting a "liability to
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dons would remain permissible-again, regardless of whether they
took property-so long as they could be adequately justified under
strict scrutiny review.3
Had the Court not only refused to incorporate the Takings
Clause, but also never adopted the doctrine of substantive due proc-
ess for economic legislation, then state economic regulations would
simply need to meet the demands of procedural due process. Even
laws that arbitrarily took property without providing just compensa-
tion would be valid so long as the laws resulted from fair and proper
democratic procedures.
The protection afforded by the Due Process Clause in and of itself
is conceptually distinct from the protection afforded by the Takings
Clause. This must have been apparent to the authors of the Fifth
Amendment; why else would they add the provision that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
if they intended this protection to be contained in the previous clause
declaring that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law? All takings are deprivations of property subject to the
requirements of the Due Process Clauses. Not all deprivations of
property, however, are subject to the requirements of the Takings
Clause. The Takings Clause goes beyond the Due Process Clause in
telling governments that even if their laws satisfy the requirements of
due process, they still cannot take property for public use without
paying just compensation.
The purpose of this Article is not to object to the position that the
Due Process Clause incorporates the Takings Clause." Rather, the
purpose is to argue for the importance of recognizing how the pro-
tections afforded property owners by the Takings Clause and the Due
pay money," which he distinguishes from a deprivation of physical or intellectual property. See
id. at 554 (Breyer,J., dissenting). AndJustice Kennedy says the Act regulates without regard to
property. See id. at 540 (Kennedy,J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court of California, relying on the Due Process Clause to strike down limitations on
rent increases, recently characterized the level of review as minimal, noting that due process
guarantees protection against "arbitrary" laws or laws that lack "a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose." See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 857
(Cal. 1997) (citations omitted).
The Court uses strict scrutiny to review laws that appear to violate fundamental rights. See
cases cited supra note 14.
Though certainly this argument can be made, and Justice Stevens suggests as much in his
dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Comment-
ing on justice Harlan's opinion in Chicago B. & Q. R Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897),Justice
Stevens writes that "[iut applied the same kind of substantive due process analysis more fre-
quently identified with a better known case that accorded similar substantive protection to a
baker's liberty interest in working 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day." Id. (citing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Justice Stevens views the Dolan majority's use of more exacting
judicial scrutiny of state regulations affecting property as a "resurrection of a species of substan-
tive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago." Id. at 405 (citation omitted). Jus-
tice Stevens does not seem to take at face value passages in Lochner in which Justice Peckham
strikes down the New York law using a minimal scrutiny rational-basis test. For a discussion of
Justice Peckham's reasoning in Lochner, see supra note 32.
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Process Clauses are conceptually distinct. By decoupling the Takings
and Due Process Clauses, we can see more clearly how the Court's
considerations are grounded in the Constitution and how the Court's
takings adjudication is integrated with its substantive due process
analysis.
In the next Section, I examine the question of when a govern-
ment regulation amounts to a taking of property.
B. Takings vs. Regulations
The words of the Takings Clause are clear: government may not
take-that is, confiscate, appropriate, seize, remove, force one to re-
linquish or transfer title of-one's property, uithout providing just
compensation. But the Court goes beyond the ordinary understand-
ing of "taking property" to conclude that property is not merely a
thing but a bundle of rights.s6 If enough "sticks" in the bundle of
rights are removed, orparticularly important ones such as the right
to viably use property,3' then the Court may conclude that property
has been taken even though the state has not physically confiscated
anything.'s
The Court's conclusion relies on its unnatural use of the word
"take." While one can be deprived of a use or a pleasure, that use or
pleasure cannot be "taken" from someone." To take is to grip, grasp,
seize, lay hold of, capture. There are other uses of "take" (which re-
ceives seventeen pages of coverage in the 1989 edition of the Oxford
E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (observing that ie right to
exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property" (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164. 176 (1979));
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (same): Andrns s.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of properts
rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety."); see also Frank Michelman, PropertU, Oiliv, and Faints: Cornments on
the Ethical Foundation of just Compensation'Lau 80 HARv. L REV. 1165. 1230-33 (1967).
3- See infra Part ILB.
Cf BRUcE AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1977). Acker-
man distinguishes the ordinary understanding of taking private property front the legal under-
standing. The legal view, he explains, holds that property is a bundle of righs-to possess. use,
exclude, and alienate. If the state takes awoay some of the sticks in this bundle of rights. it has
taken property even though it has not physically confiscated it. "1I74n7rm- te state takes any
uses right out ofJones's bundle and puts it in any other bundle, private property should be un-
derstood to have been taken." Id at 28.
s9 Sometimes we mean by "to take" not to appropriate or confiscate, but to extinguish, as
when a person takes another's life. Destroying property Lakes it ewvn when no title is trans-
ferred. See Lucas s% S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1017 (1992) (holding that deprnation
of beneficial use is the equivalent of a physical appropriation); Pumpelly %. Green Ba, Co.. 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) ("[Wlhere real estate is actually invaded b, super-induced addi-
tions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structtre placed on it. so
as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within tie meaning of die Consti-
tution."). In these instances, "take" does not refer merely to a deprivation of use. If I take sour
life, I have not merely denied you the use of something. By extinguishing iou. I have retnmoed
the possibility of any use.
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English Dictionary), including the passive "to be affected," as when
someone is taken with laughter, or a cold, or sleepiness. These pas-
sive constructions do not apply to the Takings Clause, in which "take"
is a predicate of government. The uses of "take" associated with
property or possession ("to take possession") imply not an affecting
of property, but an appropriation, such as an occupation of or mak-
ing use of for one's own purposes."
The Court should limit the applicability of the Takings Clause to
appropriations, seizures, and confiscations, and it should rely on the
Due Process Clauses to assess the constitutionality of all other regula-
tions affecting property. This argument appeals to the ordinary lan-
guage meaning of "take," to the way "taken" is juxtaposed with "pub-
lic use" (implying reference to an appropriation in which
government takes control and makes use of the property), and to the
juxtaposition of the Takings Clause with the Due Process Clause's
proscription against "deprivations." 42 Yet the Supreme Court, reluc-
40 17 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 557-73 (2d ed. 1989); cf Schwartz, supra note 10, at 420-
21 (noting definitions of "take" from Samuel Johnson's dictionary, the only one available dur-
ing the Framing era: "To seize," "To snatch," "To get; to have; to appropriate").Recent scholarship suggests that the Takings Clause originally referred to direct, physical
takings, though it cannot conclusively prove this because of gaps in the historical record. See
supra note 10; William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 782 (1995) (claiming that the Takings Clause was in-
tended to apply only to physical takings). Andrew Gold takes issue with this scholarship. To
support his view that "taking" referred to both physical and non-physical, regulatory takings,
Gold points to evidence that the Framers favored property rights. Gold, supra note 10, at 241.
However, showing that the Framers wished to protect property rights does not establish that
they intended the Takings Clause to protect against non-physical limitations on uses of prop-
erty, since the Framers could have felt that such limitations would be protected against by the
Due Process Clause. Some of Gold's own evidence suggests just this. Gold argues, for example,
that "protection for nonphysical takings, contrary to some accounts, was recognized very early
in the nation's history." Id. (citing Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2Johns. Ch.
162, 163 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)). In Gardner, says Gold, Chancellor Kent "ruled on the basis of natural
law, as due process of law" in protecting property from diversion of a stream. Id. at 229. Gold
infers from this statement that property rights encompassed more than mere possession. But
he has not shown that "taking" property meant anything more than physically appropriating it,
because Kent was not appealing to the Takings Clause. Other evidence Gold points to in order
to support his expansive reading of "taking" includes an unidentified transcription of a Lenox,
Massachusetts town meeting before ratification in which someone said that men were born with
rights, including "acquiring possessing protecting property of which rights they cannot be de-
prived but by injustice." Id. at 212. This, too, shows only that some colonists wanted a Due Pro-
cess Clause to protect against deprivations of property; it does not imply that they viewed a pro-
scrigtion against taking property as a proscription against limitations of uses.
Courts sometimes appeal to ordinary language in interpreting laws. See, e.g., Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) ("Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff re-
ceive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before lie can be said to prevail."); Rieck v.
Heiner, 20 F.2d. 208, 210 (W.D. Pa. 1927) (analyzing the "ordinary language" meaning of "ba-
sis"). However, some Justices have explicitly rejected reliance on ordinary language in inter-
preting the Takings Clause, referring to the ordinary language sense of property as the "vulgar
and untechnical sense of the physical thing." E.g. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377 (1945); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978)
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). For those who don't recognize the authority of ordinary language,
or who hear no strain in the use of "taking" to characterize a mere restriction on use, there is
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tant to rely on the other Constitutional protections afforded to prop-
erty besides those of the Takings Clause, has been unwilling to con-
cede that it is a stretch of language to classify as takings those regula-
tions of property that do not appropriate or seize.3
Many regulations affecting property, such as zoning ordinances or
rent control laws, constrain one's use of property. The Court ap-
proaches the issue of what protection the Constitution affords to
owners of private property by asking when a regulation of private
property is like a taking." When the state requires a homeowner to
move so that the house can be demolished to make way for a new
freeway, it uses its power of eminent domain to take property and
must pay just compensation.' But there are numerous ways in which
the state properly regulates property through its police powers with-
out having to pay just compensation. One sort of regulation is a re-
striction on use: a person cannot drive his car above the speed limit,
use a hammer to smash someone's car window, or use his home for
commercial purposes if it is situated in an area zoned exclusively for
residential use. While such restrictions constrain one's use of prop-
erty and may diminish its value, the state need not provide just com-
pensation.46
The state can effectively confiscate certain property wsithout pay-
ingjust compensation. For example, if the state enacts a law prohib-
no authoritative argument to support one reading or the other, no recently discovered docu-
ments written by the Framers indicating their intent to use "take" to refer only to appropria-
tions. For these skeptics, the persuasiveness of the argument in this Article ultimately must rest
on the claim that decoupling the clauses and relying on the ordinary language meaning of
"take" results in a more coherent constitutional jurisprudence ith greater integrity, ajurispru-
dence that is more principled and integrated with substantive due process doctrine.
43 Other commentators have recently suggested that the Court claify the distinct protec-
tions of the Due Process and Takings Clauses. E.g.. Eagle. supra note 15, at 980 (recommending
that the Court first conduct a due process analysis of all deprvations of property and then a
takings analysis where just compensation is appropriate); Summers, supra note 15, at 83,39.
885 (recommending the banishment of the balancing and substantial relations tests because
these are appropriate only to a due process analysis and should not be used when interpreting
the Takings Clause); see also Santa Monica Beach, Ltd., v. Superior Court. 968 P.2d 993. 1036
(Cal. 1999) (Chin,J, dissenting) (arguing against the use of due process standards when a tak-
ings standard should be used).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (i[WJhile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it ill be recognized as a *taking.'": At-
lantic Coastline R.Rt Co. v. N.C. Corp. Comm'n. 206 U.S. 1. 33 (1907) ('[A] court... is con-
fined to ascertaining whether the particular assertion of the legislative power to regulate has
been exercised to so umrarranted a degree as in substance and effect to exceed reguLation. and
be equivalent to a taking of property without due process of law.").
See ERNsT FREUmD, THE POUCE POWTR 546-47 (1904) ("The constitutional prohibition
against taking property for public use without compensation, applies to injury and destruction
as well as to appropriation, and it applies no matter for what purpose dte property is taken.')
David B. Fawcett IH, Eminent Domain, the Police Power, and the Fifth Arr.ndm nt: Defining the D-
main of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. Prrr. L REv. 491 (1986) ("IT]he individual's right to com-
pensation is strictly enforced anytime it is found that the person's property has been 'taken.'").
The Supreme Court has upheld zoning regulations that diminish the value of property as
much as 75%. SeeVllage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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iting the production or sale of alcohol, it can require that the owners
of distilleries cease operations even though the facilities have value
only in producing alcohol, without having to provide compensation
for their lost investment. 7 This government action does not violate
the Takings Clause because the use of the property is illegal.' When
government confiscates a cro? of marijuana or infected cedar trees, it
need not pay compensation.
The state can require owners to maintain their property in certain
ways without providing compensation.50 Property owners are re-
quired by law to expend resources to purchase smoke detectors and
to place these detectors on their ceilings. While this might appear to
be a taking both of one's liquid assets and of a section of one's home,
no court has held that the state must provide just compensation.5' In
each of these examples we can say that the government has regulated,
not taken, property by virtue of its police powers. But if we refuse to
be bound to the ordinary meaning of "take," it can also be argued
that even when the state merely restricts the use of property and does
not physically appropriate it, the state ought to provide just compen-
sation Following this reasoning, the concept of a regulatory taking
has emerged.
There are a number of principles to which the Court could appeal
to decide which, if any, regulations amount to takings. Principles of
47 The principle is expressed by Justice Harlan:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public
nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes de-
preciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a per-
son of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is
abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (holding that a state can prohibit the manufacture
and sale of alcoholic beverages without compensating owners of such operations). Forfeiture
cases, in which an owner's interest in property is forfeited with no compensation based upon an
illegal use of the property, appeal to the same principle. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442, 452 (1996) (stating that "government needn't compensate an owner for property which it
lawfully acquires under the exercise of government authority other than the power of eminent
domain"); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (reviewing
the history of laws requiring forfeiture of property upon felony conviction and upholding stat-
ute permitting seizure of innocent lessor's boat used by his lessee to transport marijuana).
49 See infra Part II.C.
49 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (holding that the state need not pay com-
pensation when it orders the destruction of rust-infested cedar trees that are illegal under Vir-
ginia's Cedar Rust Act).
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 453 (1982)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (noting that "New York landlords are required by law to provide and
pay for mailboxes"); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding
a law that in part required owners of buildings designated "historic landmarks" to maintain the
exterior of their buildings in good repair).
51 SeeJed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1104 (1993) (noting that states order count-
less "'permanent physical occupations' of rental property-in the form of fire escapes, window
guards, roof railings, smoke detectors, and so on" with "apparent impunity").
52 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that uncompensated state restrictions on use should be permitted
only when the restrictions prevent force or fraud).
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interpretation, for example, focus on how best to decide the meaning
of ambiguous provisions of the Constitution's text. Other principles
are concerned with the proper scope of property rights and of states'
police powers. These might consider the economic consequences of
allowing the restriction without requiring just compensation, and
they might hold that no taking occurs where social wealth is in-
creased by allowing the state to regulate in the particular instance.
There are important limitations to interpretive principles that ap-
peal to the original intention of the Framers or ratifiers of the text,
leaving aside the deep philosophical objections to privileging these
intentions. There is little evidence of a clear conception on the part
of the Framers or ratifiers of the Takings Clause, or of the Fourteenth
Amendment, of how to distinguish a compensable taking from a
noncompensable regulation.5 There is some evidence that until the
end of the nineteenth century, courts regarded the Takings Clause as
protecting possession only, not value.' Still, it seems unlikely that the
Court could conclusively discern an original intention on the part of
the Framers or ratifiers to exclude as takings the complex regulations
states now use to affect the value and use of property.
The words of the Takings Clause themselves offer no guidance for
anyone averse to relying on the plain meaning of "do not take prop-
erty" and wanting to invoke the legal conception of property as a
"bundle of rights" in order to decide how many sticks in this bundle
must be relinquished for a regulation to amount to a taking.
C. Using the Due Process Clauses to Protect Property Against
Regulations That Are Not Really Takings
Undoubtedly, one reason why the Court is unwilling to rely on the
ordinary understanding of "take"-to physically appropriate-and in-
sists on including regulations that do not physically appropriate or
seize property, is that this seems to be the only way to sufficiently pro-
tect property owners. Imagine the following situation. Mr. Potter has
invested millions of dollars purchasing dilapidated buildings that op-
erate as low-income housing in downtown Berkeley with the intention
of converting these units into luxury condominiums. Potter is per-
sonally disliked by two members of the Berkeley City Council, be-
cause he funded their opponents in the previous election campaign.
53 See ACKERM Am, supra note 38, at 8 (asserting that -there is no indication that any individ-
ual Framer (let alone the whole bunch) had worked out a particular theory of compensation
law that would suggest a determinate way of separating out those conte xts in which compensa-
tion was required from those in which losers should be left to tend their wounds without com-
munal assistance"); id. at 7 n.13 ("No researcher has discovered either an English or an Ameri-
can case before 1789 that expressly required compensation in the absence of legislative
authorization.").
54 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1057-58 (1992) (Blackmun. J., dissent-
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Hearing of Potter's investment, they develop a plan to get back at
him. They convince a majority of the council to enact a zoning ordi-
nance that prohibits the conversion of low-income rental units of the
sort Potter now owns. The Berkeley regulation is not an appropria-
tion of Potter's property; it is merely a limitation on use, a limitation
that may have dire consequences for Potter, that certainly frustrates
his investment-backed expectations, and that may have similar effects
on other owners of low-income housing in Berkeley.
If the Takings Clause offered the only legal protection of prop-
erty, and the Court relied on the ordinary language meaning of its
words, then property owners such as Potter would be out of luck. In
such a situation, it might indeed be difficult to accept the narrow, or-
dinary language (and intuitively appealing) interpretation of the Tak-
ings Clause as prohibiting only physical appropriations or confisca-
tions of property.
The Court has limited itself to the Takings Clause for constitu-
tional authority to provide protection to property owners. It has ac-
complished this by asking when a regulation is like or in effect or
similar to a taking.5 Deciding when something is like or functionally
equivalent to a taking shifts the Court's task from applying a relatively
straightforward criterion clearly found in the Constitution's text to
making judgments concerning the importance of property rights and
the proper role of the state's police powers. It is therefore not sur-
prising that takings adjudication has been rife with controversy and
disagreement over issues such as how much value must be diminished
by a regulation in order for it to be regarded as "like" a taking.'o
But the Court need not resort to simile. Restricting its interpreta-
tion of the Takings Clause by using the plain meaning of "take"
would not necessarily diminish property protections, because there
are other provisions in the Constitution providing protection to
property owners. In fact, the Due Process Clauses can be construed
more naturally than can the Takings Clause to restrict unjustified
government limitations on use. These include deprivations of prop-
erty and not just uncompensated physical appropriations. In the hy-
pothetical above, Potter could argue that the Berkeley ordinance de-
55 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[While property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 'tak-
ing.'"); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Comm'n, 206 U.S. 1, 33 (1907)
("[A] court.., is confined to ascertaining whether the particular assertion of the legislative
power to regulate has been exercised to so unwarranted a degree as in substance and effect to
exceed regulation, and be equivalent to a taking of property without due process of law.").Takings adjudication has been characterized repeatedly as in disarray and in need of re-
form. See, e.g., David Callies, Regulatoiy Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About
It, 28 STETSON L. REv. 523, 523 (1999) (citing numerous commentaries addressing the "terrible
state of takings jurisprudence"); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37




prives him of his property without due process of law, and in making
his case he could appeal to many of the considerations the Court
presently weighs in its takings analysis. As I shall argue in the follow-
ing Section, while several of the Court's considerations are irrelevant
even to deciding whether a regulation is "like" a taking, they are in
fact relevant to a due process analysis.
The purpose of the Takings Clause is not to protect citizens
against bad laws-that is, laws that are overbroad, arbitrary, insuffi-
ciently justified, economically inefficient, or unfair." Rather, the
purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent government from appro-
priating property for public purposes without paying compensation."
The idea that it is unfair to appropriate property without providing
compensation is probably the strongest rationale for the clause. Nev-
ertheless, the appropriate place to look in the Constitution for gen-
eral protections against unfair laws is not to the Takings Clause,
which is targeted at a specific type of government act, but rather to
the Due Process Clauses. The Due Process Clauses provide protec-
tions against unfair laws, both those that take property as well as those
that merely regulate it. The Due Process Clause, not the Takings
Clause, protects citizens from state laws that are overbroad, arbitrary,
insufficientlyjustified, or unfair."'
In the following section, I discuss the considerations that the
Court uses to distinguish takings from regulations. I explain the con-
fusion regarding several of these considerations-the economically
viable use test, noxious use test, fairness (or reciprocity of advantage)
test, balancing test, and nexus test-and argue that decoupling the
Takings Clause from the Due Process Clause clears up some of this
confusion and provides a principled method for deciding the scope
of protection the Constitution affords to property owners.
57 Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County. 482 LS. 304. 339
(1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued:
There is, of course, a possibility that land-use planning, like other forms of regulation.
will unfairly deprive a citizen of the right to develop his property at the time and in te
manner that will best serve his economic interests. The "regulatory taking" doctrine an-
nounced in Penn-lvania Coal places a limit on the permissible scope of land-use restric-
tions. In my opinion, however, it is the Due Process Clatise rather than that doctrine
that protects the property owner from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or un-
necessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking.
Id.
See supra notes 10, 41 and accompanying text.
Since the demise of Lochner, the Court has been reluctant to strike down economic legisla-
tion on due process grounds, see cases cited supra notes 14. 18, but recently severaljustices have
been willing to resurrect the Due Process Clause as a means of ensuring fairness. se, e.g., E. En-
ter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550 (1998) (Kennedy.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part) ("Statutes may be invalidated on due process grounds only under the mast egregious of
circumstances. This case represents one of the rare instances in which even such a permissive
standard has been violated."); id. at 556-57 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (observing that the Due Pro-
cess Clause offers protection against a "law that is fundamentally unfir").
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II. CONSIDERATIONS IN DISTINGUISHING TAKINGS FROM REGULATIONS
A. Physical Taking
Although the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence rejects the
ordinary language meaning of "take property," the Court neverthe-
less implicitly invokes this ordinary meaning-to grab, confiscate,
make use of for oneself-in developing one of its tests for whether a
regulation is a taking. Using this test, the Court holds that when the
government physically appropriates property or transfers property
rights, or does what is functionally equivalent, then the government
has taken property.6°
One important exception to the above rule is when the govern-
ment confiscates property the possession of which is illegal. In these
cases the Court does not require the government to compensate the
owner, nor should it.6' This can, for the most part, be explained by
appealing to the "noxious use" principle discussed more fully below.'
According to that principle, rights to private property do not extend
to the right to use property to harm others. Thus the government is
not violating any right when it prohibits possessing property the use
of which is generally harmful. 3
The Court has regarded this "physical taking" principle as a
bright-line rule,r although the line is sometimes difficult to draw.'
Distinguishing regulations from takings by appealing to the character
of the government action draws on ordinary understandings of "take
property" and therefore carries strong intuitive appeal. There is
nothing intrinsic to physical appropriations of property, or to trans-
fers of property rights, as against all other deprivations or denials of
property, that would make such government actions violate the Due
60 See cases cited infra note 64.
11 See supra note 47.
62 See infra Part II.C.
63 The principle that physical confiscations are takings unless they are of illegally possessed
property is not equivalent to the principle that restrictions on harmful or noxious uses of prop-
erty are regulations-and not takings-insofar as it is possible to possess property illegally with-
out harming anyone.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 527 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-28
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-26 (1978); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946).
65Justices disagree, for example, whether the government's decision to force an easement
that permits the public to move across one's property counts as a physical taking of property.
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1987). On the constitutionality
of noncompensated easement extractions, see Causby, 328 U.S. at 265 (explaining that a land-
owner has a claim to the superadjacent airspace and that invasions of it are in the same category
as invasions of the surface) and Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
329 (1922) (stating that if the government installs a battery with the effect of subordinating the
strip of land between the battery and the sea to the privilege of the government to fire projec-
tiles across it, compensation must be paid).
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Process Clauses. In other words, that a government physically appro-
priates property or transfers property rights does not, in itself, make
the government action suspect on due process grounds. If in taking
property the government acted arbitrarily or unfairly, a due process
challenge might be appropriate; but this would equally be the case
with unfair or arbitrary regulations that merely denied the use of, but
did not appropriate, property.
B. Economically Viable Use
In addition to physical takings, the Court has held that land-use
regulations that deny an owner "economically viable use of his land"
may also effect a taking.6 The viable-use test has created consider-
able confusion, because it leaves open the crucial question of when
the uses left to the regulated property are "viable enough" to fall
short of a taking. No clear answer can be given to this question un-
less we have a benchmark standard of viable property use. What is vi-
able to someone who regards the right to property as consisting only
in the right to possess may not be viable to the utilitarian or public
choice theorist who regards the right to property as the right to ex-
ploit it for socially optimal use.6' The Court uses the economic viabil-
ity standard as one among many considerations in an ad hoc inquiry,
without always clarifying why the Constitution makes it a relevant
consideration.
The economic viability test can be understood in three ways. First,
it can be seen as a surrogate for the "physical taking" test: a regula-
tion may deny economically viable use of property to such an extent
that the effect of the regulation is to physically take or transfer the
rights to the property. The Court makes this connection between the
two tests in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.' The Lucas Court
notes that there are two sorts of regulations that require compensa-
tion without inquiry into case-specific considerations: where the state
regulation amounts to a permanent physical invasion" and "where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land.""0 As authority for this latter rule, the Court cites Agins v. Tibu-
ron71 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Ke.'stone Bituminous Coal
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the state effects a Liking
if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land"); Penn Cmtl. Tnrusp.. 13. U.S. at 13s
n.36 (explaining that appellants may obtain relief if they can demonstrate that their propert)
ceases to be "economically viable").
For example, from an economist's perspective, regulations restricting use to control pol-
lution would be considered socially optimal if tiey reduced pollution to the point uhiere the
marginal net private benefit of producing pollution is equal to die marginal external cost. See
generaly R. KERRYTURNER ET AL, E,,iRONME A dL ECONOMIKs (1993).
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
SId. (citing Loretlo, 458 U.S. at 419).
70 Id
71 447 U.S. at 260 (concluding that zoning ordinances on their face do not violate the Tak-
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Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,73 and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass 'n.4
In Agins, the Court held that a regulation amounts to a taking if it
denies an owner "economically viable use of his land," but not all vi-
able use .7  The Nollan, Keystone, and Hodel passages simply refer to
this passage in Agins. Of course, Justice Scalia, writing for the Lucas
majority, has not contradicted the precedents he cites; he did not
hold that economically viable use is denied only when all economi-
cally beneficial use is denied. But while not contradicting prior rul-
ings, he has in effect proffered a new rule holding that economically
viable use is denied when all economically beneficial use is denied.
Justice Scalia suggests that the justification for this new rule may be
that regulations denying all economically viable use have the same ef-
fect as regulations that effect a physical taking. 6
The economic viability test can also be seen as one factor of a bal-
ancing test. The economic viability factor measures the "private cost"
side of the regulation, which must be weighed against the "public
benefit" side.7 When so used, the concern would be not with
whether the property owner is left any productive or beneficial use of
land, but whether the remaining uses are productive enough to jus-
tify an all-things-considered judgment supporting the regulation.
This is the sense in which the Court invoked the viability test in Agins.
There the Court explained the rule that government action consti-
tutes a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use of his land
by noting that "the question necessarily requires a weighing of private
and public interests."78 The Agins test is quite different from the test
that Justice Scalia develops in Lucas, despite the fact that Justice
Scalia says he is not inventing a new rule but only applying one al-
ready established.79 Justice Scalia's rule is logically connected only to
the Takings Clause, whereas the Agins rule is part of a balancing test
that is logically connected only to the Due Process Clauses. Uncom-
pensated denials of all viable uses of property are unconstitutional,
on Justice Scalia's view, because such regulations are takings and the
ings Clause).
72 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987) (granting the state power to condition the issuance of a per-
mit to owner on his providing the public an easement on his land only if the condition substan-
tialI advances the state's legitimate interest in otherwise denying the permit).
480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) (authorizing revocation of a mining permit if the removal of
coal causes damage to a protected structure).
452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) (allowing the implementation of uniform minimum nation-
wide regulations for surface mining).
75 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
76 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 ("We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it
is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.").
77 See infra Part II.E (discussing the balancing test in more detail).
78 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
9 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.6.
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Fifth Amendment demands that takings be compensated." A regula-
tion's uncompensated denials of economically viable uses of prop-
erty, to the extent that the regulation's private detriment outweighs
its public benefit, would be unconstitutional, 7zot because the Takings
Clause disallows uncompensated regulations that diminish social util-
ity, but because in a substantive due process analysis using height-
ened or strict scrutiny, a law violating a fundamental right to private
property that failed a balancing test could be regarded as a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.
Finally, the economic viability test can be used to evaluate the
fairness of a regulation (a consideration also to be discussed below)."'
This test measures the burden a property owner is asked to bear, and
whether this burden relative to the benefits the owner receives from
the regulation is proportional to the burdens imposed on other citi-
zens receiving similar benefits. Uncompensated and unfair denials of
the economically viable use of property would be unconstitutional,
not because the Takings Clause prohibits uncompensated unfair
regulations of property, but because in a substantive due process
analysis using heightened or strict scrutiny, a law violating a funda-
mental right to private property that was unfair could be regarded as
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court has not distinguished these three uses of the economic
viability test, even though they have entirely different rationales, are
linked to different provisions of the Constitution, and are actually dif-
ferent tests. The first test, where denial of (all) economically viable
use is a surrogate for a physical taking, is appropriate only when ap-
plying the Takings Clause. The latter two tests are appropriate only
in a due process analysis. By decoupling the Takings and Due Proc-
ess Clauses we can not only see how these three tests are linked to dif-
ferent constitutional provisions, but can better answer the question of
how the Court is to determine whether the uses left to regulated
property are "viable enough." When using the economic viability
consideration as part of a substantive due process analysis of a regula-
Justice Scalia's rule assumes that denying all viable uses of property is equivalent to taking
property for public use. Of course this assumption can be challenged. If the government tells
me I cannot drive, sell, look at, or otherwise use my car, it has denied ne all viable uses of my
property, yet we might think it has nevertheless not taken my property, because it ls not actu-
ally taken possession of, seized, grasped, or appropriated my car for public use. This conclusion
no doubt will displease advocates of property rights, who may point to this example as a reason
for not relying on the ordinary language meaning of 'take" as I advocate in this Auticle. But the
example is not fatal even to those who would insist that such a regulation uus not a taking. be-
cause government did not appropriate property. Assuming the implausible, that a government
wereever to enact such a law, either it would have to be jusified -as a health and safetq regulation
and fall under the noxious-use exception to the no-takings rule, or. absent such a justificanon,
the law could be overturned on substantive due process grounds.
81 E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523-24 (1998) (noting that "the ecunonuc impact of the
regulation" is one of the factors that are particularly significant in an inqmin into the justice
and fairness of a regulation (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 16-1. 175 (1979))).
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tion and considering whether the regulation is sufficiently warranted
on balance to justify a deprivation of property, or whether it is so un-
fair as to constitute a violation of due process of law, then it is irrele-
vant whether the regulation denies all economically viable uses of
property. What matters is whether the uses that are denied create a
detriment outweighing the regulation's benefit, or whether the bur-
den is so excessively disproportionate as to fail to meet the require-
ments of fairness. When we are concerned with the fairness of sad-
dling a property owner with a relatively greater burden than others
who receive similar benefits are asked to bear or we are weighing the
private cost of a regulation against its public benefit, nothing hinges
on whether the burden or private cost is the denial of all economi-
cally beneficial use.
C. Noxious Use
Where government takes property to prevent harm or illegalities,
as when it confiscates marijuana crops or orders the destruction of
diseased trees, it does not have to pay just compensation for the re-
sulting loss in value to the property owner. In these cases the gov-
ernment is not violating the plain meaning of the Takings Clause, be-
cause it is not appropriating property for its own (and thus for
public) use or profiting from its confiscation. 2 The noxious use test
serves as an exception-rule, selecting out among takings those that do
not require payment of just compensation. The Court considers
whether a noxious use of property is involved also when a govern-
ment merely restricts the use of property but does not physically take
or appropriate it.s 3 This deployment of a noxious use test, like the
Court's adoption of several other considerations, has not been ade-
quately tied to the text of the Constitution. I shall argue in this Sec-
tion that the noxious use test has a role in an analysis of the scope of
constitutionally protected property rights, both for government tak-
ings of property and for regulations that merely restrict use, but the
nature of and rationale for the tests are different in each case.
Before discussing how a decoupling of the Takings and Due Proc-
ess Clauses leads to distinct uses of a noxious use test that are more
securely moored to the Constitution's text, it will be helpful to see
how the noxious use test currently is implemented by the Court. Un-
der current law a government may regulate or take property without
paying just compensation if in doing so it is preventing a noxious or
82 While confiscation in these two examples is intended to promote the public good, the
confiscated property is not being used by government for a public use, in contrast to compen-
sable takings, the paradigmatic example of which is a state's taking land to build a railroad or
freeway. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 126 (1978) (noting that in
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the government, while ordering cedar trees to be cut,
permitted claimants to use the felled trees and did not appropriate them).
83 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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harmful use of that property." The Courtjustifies this rule by argu-
ing that private property rights do not include the right to use prop-
erty to harm others. When the government prohibits the use of
property in harmful ways or the possession of property that is intrin-
sically harmful, it is therefore not violating any rights. As Justice
Blackmun notes, courts uphold bans on particular uses ithout pay-
ing compensation, "notwithstanding the economic impact, under the
rationale that no one can obtain a vested right to injure or endanger
the public."s'
The noxious use standard has raised a problem of how the Court
is to decide whether a restriction is prohibiting a harmful use or, in-
stead, merely realizing a public benefit distinct from the cessation of
a harmful or illegal use of property. I shall call such a benefit a "non-
nuisance restraint benefit." The line between a restraint that miti-
gates harm and a non-nuisance restraint benefit is sometimes difficult
to draw.ss This is apparent in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,s  in which the Court held that zoning laws that pro-
hibit commercial uses of property in residential districts are valid
regulations and not takings. The Euclid ordinance restricted com-
mercial uses of property in order to promote "health mad security
from injury of children and others by separating dwelling houses
from territory devoted to trade and industry," to facilitate "the extin-
guishment of fires, and the enforcement of street traffic regulations
and other general welfare ordinances," and to make construction and
repair of streets easier and less expensive "by confining the greater
part of the heavy traffic to the streets where business is carried on.
The goals of the Euclid ordinance can be construed either as pro-
viding a public benefit or as preventing harm. Unable conclusively to
settle on either interpretation of the ordinance's purpose, the Court
84 See supra note 47; see also Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los kngeles. 370 P.2d 342
(Cal. 1962) (holding an ordinance constitutional on grounds that it protected the general pub-
lic from uses of property that would be injurious to them); Turner v. Cou of Del Note, 101
Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (upholding zoning ordinance creating flood plain and re-
stricting certain uses of property); Nassr v. Commonwealth. 477 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 195i (up-
holding the actions of the Commonwealth on the grounds that tie public interest Lakes prefer-
ence over individual private property rights); Commonwealth v. Mlger. 61 Mass. (7 Cush,)
(Mass. 1851) (authorizing the Commonwealth to exercise its police pouer to seize or dcstrom
property when necessary to prevent injuries to tile rights of others, public health, and welfareJ;
St- Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 1911) (grning tile cits tie
power to regulate billboards with ordinances if necessary to maintain peace uid safety): Brick
Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1827) (holding it unreasonable to
allow plaintiffs to endanger the lives of others); Eno v. Burlington. 2011 A.2d .199 Wt. 19651
(upholding drastic fire regulations).
85 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1058 (1992) (Blacknun.J., d& sentmg).
See, eg., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 (-A given restraint %ill be seen as utigating 'hann" to tile
adjacent parcels or securing a 'benefit' for them, depending upon the observer's etltion of
the relative importance of the use that the restraint favors."); see also Michelman, supra note 36;
Sax, supra note 56.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 391.
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appeals to both. In parts of the opinion, the Court upholds the law
by construing the ordinance as providing a non-nuisance restraint
public benefit but holding that this in itself does not mean the state
must pay compensation. To support this position, the Court cites
one case that regards provision of a non-nuisance restraint benefit as
within the scope of legitimate police powers:
The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is not a
declaration that such places are nuisances or that they are to be suppressed as
such, but it is a part of the general plan by which the city's territory is al-
lotted to different uses in order to prevent, or at least to reduce, the con-
gestion, disorder and dangers which often inhere in unregulated mu-
nicipal development.89
But the Court also cites another case that views such laws as pre-
venting nuisances:
Aside from considerations of economic administration, in the matter
of police and fire protection, street paving, etc., any business establishment
is likely to be a genuine nuisance in a neighborhood of residences. Places of
business are noisy; they are apt to be disturbing at night; some of them
are malodorous; some are unsightly; some are apt to breed rats, mice,
roaches, flies, ants, etc. .... "
The Court does not acknowledge that it invokes two distinct and
competing arguments to defend the Euclid ordinance. Sometimes it
regards the ordinance as preventing noxious uses of property; other
times the Court treats the ordinance as providing a non-nuisance re-
straint public benefit and rejects the requirement that limits on
property rights must be compensated unless they restrict noxious
uses of property.
The fact that trucks enter an individual's property, thereby caus-
ing wear and tear to street pavement and potentially causing conges-
tion that might hamper fire protection, does not in itself make that
person's use of property for business purposes illegal. Under the ra-
tionale for the nuisance test laid out above, the state should not be
able to prevent a person from using his property for business pur-
poses, unless his use is a morally relevant cause of harm or is illegal.
Of course, once a zoning law is enacted prohibiting commercial uses
of property, his use becomes illegal, even if it is not a morally relevant
cause of harm.
A further question then arises. The noxious use test laid out
above regards a use as noxious if property rights do not extend to
that use. Are there any limits on what legislators can decree regard-
ing the uses to which property rights extend? We might think that
the spirit of the noxious use exception is to allow government to pre-
89 ld. at 392-93 (citing City of Aurora v. Bums, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (I11. 1925)) (emphasis
added).




vent only harmful uses, in which case we would want to prevent legis-
lators from simply decreeing that a use is harmful and therefore ille-
gal, unless the use is actually harmful. Whether a use is actually
harmful requires us to be attentive to the meaning of "harm," as op-
posed to mere offense, and to what counts as "causing," as opposed to
merely contributing to harm."'
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Lucas, addresses this ques-
tion and, in doing so, modifies the noxious use test in two important
ways. First, he holds that a special noxious use analysis should be in-
voked in cases where the state wholly eliminates the value of the land
that it is regulating. "Afortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-
use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categori-
cal rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated."
" ForJus-
tice Scalia, what is decisive about previous cases in which the Court
upheld a regulation on the grounds that the state was preventing a
noxious use, was that in none of these cases had "the regulation
wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's land." ' Where all eco-
nomically beneficial use of land is prohibited, he argues, a stricter
standard must be used to determine whether the regulation passes
the noxious use test.Y
The second way in which Justice Scalia modifies the noxious use
test is by developing this stricter standard. Rather than relying on the
subjective judgments ofJustices in deciding whether a given restraint
is mitigating harm or securing a benefit in "total takings" situations,
Justice Scalia appeals to what he regards as an objective standard: the
common-law definition of noxious use in the relevant state. He ex-
plains, "Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensa-
tion only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with."9' He continues:
9 For a philosophical discussion of the concept of "causing harm." see JOEL F1%BE3R(;,
HARM TO OTHERs (1984) (developing the principle that the state may legitimnately coerce only
to prevent harm to others, through elaboration of the distinction betwen harn and offense
and discussion of various senses of causation).
92 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1006. 1026 (1992).
9S Id. at 1026 & n.13 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead. 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding toln
ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating on property within its limits); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding that there is no taking when te government prohibits
the operation of a brickyard within a residential area); Reinman v. Little Rock. 237 U.S. 171
(1915) (holding that though a livery stable is not a nuisance per se. the regulation of such sta-
bles lies within the state's police power); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penns)lvania. 232 U.S. 531
(1914) (upholding state statute requiring owners of adjoining coal properties to construct bar-
rier pillars to safeguard employees); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding state
amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors except for medical,
scientific, and mechanical purposes)).
94 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.
9 Id. at 1027.
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[Such limitations by states must] inhere in the title itself, in the restric-
tions that background principles of the State's law of property and nui-
sance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an
effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or
other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nui-
sance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances
that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
96
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lucas, rejects Justice Scalia's un-
derstanding of the noxious-use precedents:
In none of the cases did the Court suggest that the right of a State to
prohibit certain activities without paying compensation turned on the
availability of some residual valuable use. Instead, the cases depended on
whether the government interest was sufficient to prohibit the activity,
97given the significant private cost.
And in the earlier case of Nollan, Justice Brennan takes issue with
Justice Scalia's view that we are not bound to statutory (as opposed to
common law) definitions of noxious use.98
The noxious use test as currently used by the Court raises several
problems. Should different versions of the test be used depending
on whether the state restriction leaves any economically beneficial
use? Should the state's power to regulate be limited only to the pre-
vention of harmful uses, or should it extend to the provision of non-
nuisance restraint public benefits? If it should be limited to preven-
tion of harmful uses, how do we decide what counts as a harmful use
of property? In answering that question, what deference should be
given to legislators-can they simply decree that a use is harmful and
therefore illegal?
The Court raises all of these issues but has never adequately ex-
plained why they are constitutionally relevant. On the decoupling
approach, the Court would rarely need to undertake a rigorous re-
view of what it means to cause harm or of whether deciding what
counts as a noxious use is better left to legislators. Answering these
questions would be fruitful only in a Takings Clause analysis. On the
decoupling approach, however, most regulations affecting property
would be subject only to a due process analysis, for which deciding
the difficult philosophical question of causation, and the problem of
Id. at 1029. Cf. Callies, supra note 56, at 562 (arguing that "background principles of state
property law" should refer not to whatever regulations burdened the owner's title when he ac-
quired the land, but to law that is "truly old, well-known, and of reasonably universal applicabil-
ity in the state jurisdiction").
97 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1050-51 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
98 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 857 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan argued, "It is axiomatic, of course, that state law is the source of those strands
that constitute a property owner's bundle of property rights." Although he does not explicitly
distinguish a state's statutory law from its common law, the thrust of the passage is that it is up
to the state legislators, and not the courts, to decide the scope of property rights.
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what deference is due legislators in resolving that question, are not
central.
The Takings Clause requires that private property not be taken
for public use withoutjust compensation. We can infer from this fact
that where government takes property to provide a non-nuisance re-
straint public benefit, it has taken for public use and must pay just
compensation, but where government acts to prevent a noxious use
of property, it need not payjust compensation. I call this the "strict
noxious use test." But the Takings Clause does not apply to all regu-
lations affecting property. On the decoupling approach, the consid-
eration of whether a taking prevents a harm or provides a non-
nuisance restraint public benefit has no logical bearing on the consti-
tutionality of regulations that restrict property wfithout physically ap-
propriating it. Such regulations do not become unconstitutional tak-
ings merely because they cannot be shown to prevent harmful uses of
property. In reviewing these non-taking deprivations of property we
must turn to the Due Process Clauses. What role does a noxious use
test have when applying these clauses?
The strict noxious use test would be appropriate in deciding
whether a use-restriction amounted to a deprivation of property
without due process, but only if in considering due process questions
we accepted the doctrine of substantive due process and were com-
mitted to using strict scrutiny. The strict noxious use test is one po-
tential surrogate for the familiar strict scrutiny due process test that
demands that laws affecting fundamental rights be substantially re-
lated to the achievement of a compelling state purpose. For if we can
say that the use restriction is preventing a use of property that is
harmful, then we can say that the state's deprivation of "life, liberty,
or property" is not without substantive due process, because such a
restriction is substantially related to the realization of a compelling
purpose, namely, the prevention of harm. Of course, the fact that a
law does not pass the strict noxious use test does not mean the law
cannot be sufficienly justified on other grounds to pass a strict scru-
tiny due process test.
There are less restrictive versions of a noxious use test. Those who
see the police power as legitimately extending to the promotion of
public welfare, even where the power is not used to prevent an action
that is a morally relevant cause of identifiable harm, could employ a
minimal noxious use test. This minimal test would ask whether limit-
ing a use of property is rationally related to the promotion of the
public welfare, regardless of whether the limitation prevents a nui-
sance or provides a non-nuisance restraint benefit. A heightened ver-
sion of this test might also be employed. The heightened test would
ask the additional question of whether tle public benefit provided by
the use restriction outweighs its private cost. The minimal and
heightened versions of the noxious use test are appropriate only
when undertaking a due process analysis, because they address the
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considerations of whether a law is narrowly tailored or justified on
balance-considerations that do not bear on whether the law takes
property.'
Employing the strict noxious use test in takings situations still pre-
sents the problem of how we determine whether a use is wrongful,
but this problem is not insurmountable. There are easy cases where
we can clearly distinguish between preventing harm and providing
non-nuisance restraint benefits. Resolving more difficult cases will
require careful analysis of the concepts of harm and of causing harm.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia ,ves up too easily when he asserts that such an
analysis is "impossible."
One necessary criterion for causing harm is setting back interests
that are regarded as rights.'0 ' In Lucas, David Lucas challenged a
regulation preventing him from building any permanent structures
on land he had purchased for nearly $1 million. The purpose of the
law was to prevent development that might contribute to soil erosion
and tidal floods and might harm endangered species. Clearly, the
citizens of South Carolina have interests in maintaining the integrity
of their beaches and preserving endangered species, but it is not
clear that setting back these interests violates rights. Moreover, build-
ing a house on the lot does not cause harm in the same way that a
fungus on cedar trees would cause harm to neighboring apple or-
chards, or in the way that someone driving his car ninety miles per
hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone potentially causes foreseeable
harm. Any harm resulting from tidal floods could not be attributed
to the fact that Lucas built a house on his lot-there are too many in-
tervening and concurrent causes of harm. The regulation Lucas
challenged would likely fail a strict scrutiny noxious use test. But this
fact would be relevant only if the South Carolina regulation effected a
taking and it was necessary to determine whether this regulation met
the noxious use exception to takings. There are reasons for holding
that Lucas's land was not taken.0 2 If we accept those reasons, then to
99 The minimal noxious use test is an instance of a nexus test. See infra Part II.F. In Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the Court ruled that requiring Miller to cut down his cedar trees
because they were carrying a fungus destructive to neighboring apple orchards was a valid regu-
lation and not a taking. The Court explained:
We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a
nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute
.... For where, as here, the choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that its exercise, con-
trolled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any denial
of due process.
Id. at 280. This passage in the Miller decision relies on the decoupling approach, which later
Courts have failed to recognize.
100 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
101 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 91, at 36 (arguing that "no plausibly interpreted harm prin-
ciple could support the prohibition of actions that cause harms without violating rights").For example, in his Lucas dissent, Justice Blackmun notes that there are other beneficial
uses left to the property. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 n.3 ("Of course... Lucas may put his land
to 'other uses'-fishing or camping, for example--or may sell his land to his neighbors as a
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fully resolve the issue of whether his constitutionally protected prop-
erty rights have been violated requires further due process analysis.
The decoupling approach allows us to distinguish different appli-
cations of a noxious use test and shows that the problem of differen-
diating regulations that prevent harm and those that merely provide a
benefit is not as serious as supposed. It also provides a reason to re-
jectJustice Scalia's new noxious use rule in Lucas. Justice Scalia ar-
gues that in "total takings" situations the government is excused from
paying compensation only if it is preventing a noxious use according
to the common law definition of noxious use in the relevant state.
He does not explain why this standard is required by the Constitu-
tion. On the decoupling approach, the standard should be rejected.
The best reason for using common law definitions of noxious use to
decide whether a taking need not be compensated is that the com-
mon law establishes reasonable expectations of what investors can
and cannot do with their property, and it would be unfair to allow a
legislature suddenly to enact statutory definitions of noxious use that
undermine reasonable investor-backed expectations created by long-
standing common law. But the fairness of a government's act is be-
side the point in deciding whether the government has taken prop-
erty. Fairness enters into a takings analysis only once it has been
established that a taking occurred and we then inquire into what
compensation is just. But whether the government acted fairly is ir-
relevant in deciding whether it has appropriated property for public
use-it either has or hasn'L'o As will be discussed in the next Sec-
tion, fairness is an appropriate standard only in a due process analy-
sis, and in a due process analysis whether or not a government regu-
lation of property amounts to a "total taking" is beside the point.
There is no principled, textually grounded basis for using a common
law standard of noxious use in "total takings" situations.
D. Fairness, or Reciprocity of Advantage
In an often cited passage from Armstrong v. United States, the Court
held that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee [against uncompensated
takings of property is] designed to bar government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'" In an earlier
case, Justice Holmes expressed this requirement of fairness as "an av-
erage reciprocity of advantage" that in some cases may be sufficient to
buffer. In either event, his land is far from 'valueless.'"). Moreover. there %%as no transfer of
property rights or physical occupation of the property, nor did tie state make use of LuAcs'S
progerty.
See infra Part II.D.
164
364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
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justify government actions affecting property.'0 But as the Court
noted in a later opinion, it has "been unable to develop any 'set for-
mula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons.""'
Morality might require that all laws be fair, but is this requirement
written into the Constitution? In its decision incorporating the Tak-
ings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court suggests this
requirement is implicit in the words of the Takings Clause. In de-
fending the principle that a taking of property requires just compen-
sation, which the Court observes is a principle "recognized by all
temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal
sense of its justice,"' it adds that this principle "prevents the public
from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the
burdens of government, and says that, when he surrenders to the
public something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be re-
turned to him."'0'
The Court rightly points to a rationale for the Takings Clause: it
is unfair for government to take without paying. But drawing a con-
nection between fairness and takings is misleading if one implies that
the fairness of a government act is relevant to whether it is a taking-
in fact, it is relevant only in deciding whether the government act vio-
lates due process. There is nothing intrinsic to a regulation's being
fair or unfair that bears on whether it comports with the ordinary
understanding of "taking" property. Nor is fairness of this sort rele-
vant to the legal understanding according to which taking property is
taking some of the sticks in the bundle of property rights. When the
state physically takes property, then it has taken property whether it
does so arbitrarily, unfairly, or fairly. In some cases, if the state has
taken property in return for benefits received, thereby satisfying the
demands of fairness, as in the case of taxation, those benefits can be
regarded as just compensation. But this does not mean that the fair-
ness of a regulation is a criterion for whether it is a taking.'09 That the
state physically takes one person's property but no one else's-even
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (noting that "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage ... has been recognized as ajustification for various laws").
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
7 Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897).
1014 Id.
10 9
Justice Scalia draws exactly the opposite conclusion: he seems to think that if a regulation
denies all productive uses and thereby amounts to a physical taking, this implies that the regula.
tion is unfair. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992). Not only is this
untrue (one need think only of noxious use exceptions), but the point of drawing this implica-
tion is elusive. Why use an explicit constitutional standard ("no takings") to infer a moral stan-
dard that is at best only implicit in the Takings Clause ("be fair")?
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though the benefits of the taking are received by all equally-does
not thereby make the taking unfair. On the contrary, while physical
appropriations of property undertaken to prevent noxious uses of
property may saddle a severe burden on a lone individual, the bur-
den is not unfair precisely because there is a compelling reason to
single out the individual. It would be unfair to make other citizens
pay to remedy the wrong caused by the individual's noxious use of his
property.
Under current takings adjudication, fairness is uncritically ac-
cepted as a consideration relevant in interpreting the Takings
Clause."' While a primary motivation for including a Takings Clause
in the Bill of Rights must have been the sentiment that it is unfair for
government to take property withwut paving for it, this does not mean
that a taking for public use becomes any less (more) of a taking if it is
fair (unfair), or that a use-restriction regulation's unfairness makes
the regulation a taking, that is, an appropriation or transfer of rights.
The only textual provisions that logically support a declaration that
an unfair regulation of property is unconstitutional are the Due Pro-
cess Clauses.
Fairness is embedded in due process requirements in a number of
ways. Laws enacted by a majority that single out a small class and im-
pose an undue burden on them may violate the requirements of pro-
cedural due process if these laws resulted from the exclusion of that
class from the political process."' Perhaps more relevant to regula-
tions affecting property owners, laws which fail to provide an "average
reciprocity of advantage," which single out a class of property owners
to bear an unfair burden, or which are unfair in other ays (such as
by frustrating reasonable, relied upon expectations), may violate the
requirements of substantive due process. The idea here is that fair-
ness is a conceptual requirement of law. Enforcement of laws that
arbitrarily or unfairly single out some people is, on this argument,
not really to invoke the "law." To uphold "due process of law," gov-
ernment must comply with basic requirements of fairness and ration-
ality.
How fair must laws be to satisfy the constitutional demands of due
process of law? Answering that question requires exploring in more
no Seecases cited supra notes 104-07; see also E. Enter. v. Apfel. 521 U.S. 498. 523 (1998) (nsat-
ing that in a takings analysis, "the process for evaluating a regulation's constitutionalit innolres
an examination of the justice and fairness' of the governmental action" (eiing Andnas %. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979))).
I SeegenerallyJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST (190); Sutmiers, supras note 15, at
880 (supporting stricter scrutiny for a substantial relation test of properts regulatitns In order
to protect discrete and insular minorities).
2 The Court's consideration of whether a regulation frustrates reasonable imestor-backed
expectations, while relevant in a fairness analysis, is also relevant in a balancing lest ,snah'. s
since a regulation's effect on future investments may figure greadys in a caltulatntio of its tier
social utility. This consideration is therefore discussed in the next section on the 'bllzacng
test."
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detail the idea of fairness. While the purpose of this Article is to show
how considerations of fairness are properly tied to the Due Process
Clauses rather than to the Takings Clause, and not to discuss pre-
cisely what level of fairness the Constitution requires of laws, it is ap-
propriate to say something about the requirement of fairness so that
we can see how a fairness analysis can be adapted to substantive due
process reviews of regulations.
According to the argument from fairness invoked by moral phi-
losophers discussing political obligations, the receipt of public goods
from which we benefit entails an obligation, based on fairness, to
contribute to the cooperative ventures that provide these goods so
long as the benefits and burdens of such ventures are distributed
fairly."3 It is unfair for a person to benefit from the cooperative ef-
forts of others without contributing to these efforts, and it follows
that if others contribute, one has an obligation to reciprocate. Not to
obey or contribute to cooperative schemes from which one benefits
in society, such as national defense, is to place an unfair burden on
those who do."14 Applied to government regulations of property, this
moral argument holds that it is unfair for the state to require an indi-
vidual to make a greater contribution to a cooperative scheme rela-
tive to the benefit received from that scheme than is made by other
citizens relative to the benefits they receive. If a cooperative scheme
produces a total benefit B spread evenly among n citizens at a total
cost C, it is unfair for the state to require an individual who receives a
benefit of B/n to pay a cost greater than C/n.
This is a strict standard of fairness that is sometimes difficult to
meet, and it may in some cases be unreasonable to expect anyone to
satisfy it. For example, in the cooperative venture of a potluck dinner
it is unreasonable to expect each participant to bring food of pre-
cisely the same quantity and quality as they consume. Moreover, abil-
ity to pay may be relevant in assessing the fairness of the distribution
of contributions. However, we do typically regard it as unfair if
someone partakes in the food and drink without having contributed
anything or if someone is required to contribute though they do not
intend to and do not partake in the food or drink. A minimal re-
quirement of fairness requires only that a person not be unreasona-
bly saddled with a burden. For example, no one can rightly be sad-
dled with a burden if they receive no benefit from the cooperative
113 See generally GEORGE KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION
(1992); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REv. 2, 175-91 (1955), reprinted in
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53 (Anthony Quinton ed., 1967); John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the
Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 9, 9-10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964); Mark Tunick, The
Moral Obligation to Obey LawJ. Soc. PHIL. (forthcoming).
114 There is yet another sense of fairness relevant to the issue of property rights: it is unfair
for the state suddenly to change the rules of property development upon which a person had
relied in making her investments. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
idea that fairness requires respecting reasonable investment-backed expectations).
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scheme. Further, no one can rightly receive benefits from a scheme
without contributing something. Some discretion remains in deter-
mining whether a burden is imposed unreasonably, and stricter and
more lax standards can be used when interpreting this "minimal" re-
quirement of fairness.
Whether a regulation of property violates due process on fairness
grounds will depend on how scrupulously fair we require laws to be to
satisfy the demands of due process, which in turn depends on what
level of judicial review we believe is appropriate in a due process
analysis. There is substantial case law on the question of appropriate
standards in a due process analysis," ' but this precedent has been vir-
tually ignored in takings adjudication because of the Court's failure
to decouple the Takings and Due Process Clauses.
E. Balancing Test
In deciding whether use restrictions amount to compensable tak-
ings, the Court also employs a balancing test that weighs the private
costs of the restriction against its public benefits. The test w's most
famously used by justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahan."'
ThereJustice Holmes held as an unconstitutional taking a statute that
in the particular application at issue prohibited the defendant's min-
ing of coal in such a way as to cause a subsidence of the surface be-
neath the plaintiff's house. In that case, the plaintiff had agreed to
provide to the defendant the right to mine the land beneath the
house and to waive claims for damages consequent to the mining.
Justice Holmes argued that "the public interest" served by the statute
is "limited," since ordinarily the surface of land is owned by the miner
of the coal beneath. The statute could not be justified as a promo-
tion of personal safety, since "[t]hat could be provided for by no-
tice.""' Against the statute's limited benefits must be weighed its
great costs: "It purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania
as an estate in land.""" As applied to the facts in this case, Justice
Holmes thinks it "clear that the statute does not disclose a public in-
terest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defen-
dant's constitutionally protected rights." "
Despite references to balancing private costs against public bene-
fits, the Court seldom conducts a genuine balancing test in property
1 Where a law impinges on a fundamental right, the Court uses strict scrutiny. but wherc a
law does not, or is merely an economic regulation, the Court uses a mininal scrutiny rational-
basis test. See cases cited supra note 14.
116 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
17 Id. at 414.
118 Id.
119 Id. Justice Holmes proceeds to argue that the law is unconstitutional on its face and not
merely as applied. In doing so, he places great weight on what he regards as the unfairness of
the law, its failure to secure an 'average reciprocity of advantage." I. at 415.
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rights cases. The Court rarely engages in serious economic analysis
and rarely invokes the concept of economic efficiency in a rigorous
manner or otherwise undertakes the sort of calculation required by
economists or utilitarians in determining optimal social policy.
Some of the considerations that would be relevant to an econo-
mist's or utilitarian's rigorous balancing test are invoked by the
Court, but for different purposes. For example, the Court has often
regarded as relevant to deciding the takings issue whether a regula-
tion has violated "reasonable investment-backed expectations. ', '2
This factor could be important in a rigorous balancing test, because
of the consequences to social welfare of deterring investment in pro-
ductive activities by making those investments uncertain. But the
Court has never made an effort to quantify the potential impact on
social wealth of lost future investments and actually weigh this impact
against the public benefit of the regulation.
2'
The consideration of a regulation's effect on investment-backed
expectations could also be relevant in considering its fairness. Take,
for example, an individual who invested in property with the reason-
able expectation that he could develop it, but who, if he had known
that he would not be able to develop the property, would not have
purchased it. When the state tells him after his purchase that he may
120 Connollyv. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986) (identifying three fac-
tors of "particular significance" in considering whether a given regulation constitutes a "tak-
ing"); see also Concrete Pipe v. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (holding Con-
crete Pipe did not display sufficient interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations where pension plans at issue had "long been subject to federal regulations"); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (distinguishing Pennsylvania
Coal and finding no interference with investment-backed expectations); Bowen v. Gilliard, '183
U.S. 587, 606 (1987) (citing Connolly's three factors, including reasonable investment-backed
expectations, as important to any inquiry into whether a government regulation constitutes a
taking); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986) (noting that
takings analysis involved "ad hoc factual inquiries that have identified several factors" and point-
ing to interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations as one factor to be consid-
ered); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 860, 865 (1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(noting "appellants can make no reasonable claim to any expectation of being able to exclude
members of the public from crossing the edge of their property to gain access to ocean" where
the state constitution explicitly prohibited them from excluding access to navigable waters "for
any public purpose"); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985) (finding no taking be-
cause regulation of property rights does not "take" private property when an individual's rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)
(noting that "a comparison of values before and after [government regulation] is relevant" to a
consideration of whether a regulation constitutes a taking).
121 There are occasionally references to there being an economic impact of interference with
investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8
(1992) ("[A]s we have acknowledged time and again, '[t]he economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and ... the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.") (citation omit-
ted); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) ("The eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, especially the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations, is of particular significance.").
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no longer do what he had intended with the property, then he and
other investors would likely be deterred from developing property in
useful ways in the future. By suddenly changing the rules of the
game upon which the investor had relied, we might also say the state
has treated him unfairly.i -s On a few occasions the Court has either
implicitly or explicitly linked the consideration of a regulation's ef-
fect on investment-backed expectations to the principle of fairness.'t"
More often, the Court simply asserts that a regulation's effect on in-
vestment-backed expectations is an important consideration, without
explaining the principle upon which this consideration bears or pre-
cisely how the consideration is to be weighed.,
The "investment-backed expectation" consideration has also been
put to use, albeit less convincingly, as the decisive factor for determin-
ing whether a special class of regulations, those that deny property of
all value and thereby functionally effect a physical taking, are takings
requiring just compensation. In his concurring opinion in Luras,Jus-
tice Kennedy writes, "Where a taking is alleged from regulations
which deprive the property of all value, the test [of whether property
rights were violated] must be whether the deprivation is contrary to
reasonable, investment-backed expectations."' Justice Kennedy gives
no explanation for the requirement that a "finding of no value must
be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner's
1- Cf. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FUN(ET. in Two CL.-sICS OF
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Doubleday 1989). Burke observed:
When men are encouraged to go into a certain mode of life by tie existing laws, and
protected in that mode as in a lawful occupation-when dicy have accommodated l
their ideas, and all their habits to it--hien the law had long made their adherence to its
rules a ground of reputation, and their departure from them a ground of disgrace and
even of penalty--I am sure it is unjust in legislature. by an arbitrary act. to offer a sudden
violence to their minds and their feelings; forcibly to degrade them from their state and
condition, and to stigmatize with shame and infamy that character and those customs
which before had been made the measure of their happiness and honour.
Id. at 171. See also MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES: APPROAcIIES TO ETHIL AxND
LEGALJUDGMENT 157, 196-97, 204 (1998) (discussing the unfairness of undermining expecta-
tions upon which people reasonably rely).
12 See, e-g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704. 715 (1987) (finding that Indiuns whose decedents
had received land from the government in exchange for ceding to tie United States large parts
of the original Great Sioux Reservation had no investment-backcd expectations in the land).
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1. 14 (1984) (arguing that some 'burdens
consequent upon government action undertaken in the public interest... are so substantial
and unforeseeable ... that 'justice and fairness* require that tie% be borne bv the public as a
whole"); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986. 1006-07 (1984) (holding that Molsanto
was required to give up its property interest in health, safety, and efficienc) data when the go%-
eminent concluded disclosure to the general public was necessary in exchange for the right to
market pesticides).
14 The Court, rather, characterizes the "investment-backed expectations" test as part of an ad
hoc inquiry. See, eg.. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. .80 U.S..171). 495
(1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986); Nollan s. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan C.'V Corp..
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins. 447 U.S. 74. 83 (1980; Katiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
12 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy.J., concurring).
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reasonable, investment-backed expectations, "0 6 although he cites as
authority a passage in Penn Central Transportation that mistakenly
characterizes physical invasions of property as intrinsically unfair."'7
This use of the "investment-backed expectation" criterion is uncon-
vincing, because the fact that such expectations have been violated is
irrelevant in deciding whether property has been physically taken.
The frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations is rele-
vant in deciding whether property rights have been violated, not be-
cause undermining expectations is intrinsic to the physical taking of
property, but because frustrating such expectations is unfair, and in a
substantive due process analysis the Court engaged in strict or
heightened scrutiny might want to strike down a law that is grossly
unfair. Such expectations are relevant also because violations of fair-
ness would have economic implications that one might want to take
into account in a substantive due process balancing test.
The decoupling approach permits analysis of the true constitu-
tional moorings not only for the investment-backed expectation con-
sideration, but for all applications of a balancing test. The Takings
Clause requires only that government not take property without just
compensation, not that it must enact economically efficient legisla-
tion or augment social utility. A regulation that diminishes the value
of, but does not physically take or appropriate, property does not be-
come a taking upon proof that the costs of the regulation greatly ex-
ceed its benefits. That proof is relevant in deciding whether the
regulation violates property rights only as evidence that the law vio-
lates one of the Due Process Clauses. As we have seen, instead of en-
gaging in a rigorous balancing test, the Court takes into account con-
siderations that would be relevant to such a balancing test, but it
sometimes uses those considerations for other purposes. '8 In princi-
ple the Court could apply public choice theory more rigorously to de-
termine what outcomes are efficient and adopt a true balancing test.
Doing so might be appropriate either in invoking the Takings Clause
or upon using strict scrutiny in a due process analysis. Yet it is impor-
tant to be clear about precisely what role balancing tests play for each
sort of analysis.
126 Id.
127 See Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("A 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.") (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). The Penn Central Court was incorrect to imply that a regulation that can be character-
ized as a physical invasion is therefore presumptively unfair. A regulation of property is unfair
if the regulation requires some property owners to bear a significantly greater burden relative
to the benefits they receive than is borne by other citizens relative to the benefits they receive,
or if the regulation violates reasonable, relied upon expectations. There is nothing intrinsically
unfair about physical invasions of property.
2 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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In a Takings Clause analysis the Court sometimes needs to decide
whether a physical taking is justified by the noxious use exception.
This decision requires the Court to distinguish between takings that
eliminate harmful uses and those that provide non-nuisance restraint
benefits. While philosophical analysis of the concept of causing harm
helps to decide this question in many cases, for some cases the prob-
lem may be insoluble unless we employ the tools of public choice
theory and economics. This might be one occasion for employing a
rigorous balancing test.'-
The balancing test that would be used in a due process analysis
would be less restrictive. That test would involve a general considera-
tion of costs and benefits to decide, not whether a noxious use excep-
tion applies to a physical taking, but whether the law is stfficiently
justified to withstand judicial scrutiny. Using this test in a due proc-
ess analysis might require abandoning a long line of cases rejecting
the use of strict scrutiny to decide whether economic regulations de-
prive liberty or property without due process of law, a line of cases
that has a powerful justification: legislative bodies are more
equipped to engage in economic and public policy analysis than are
Supreme CourtJustices.I
SO
On the other hand, as the protection of property is explicitly re-
quired by the Due Process Clauses, the Court has a textual basis for
scrutinizing more closely even "economic" regulations where they in-
fringe on an explicit, fundamental right. Because the Court is ill
equipped to engage in rigorous economic analysis, use of the balanc-
ing test is perhaps the easiest target for those troubled by the doc-
trine of substantive due process. A fairness test should be more read-
ily accepted as one the Court is better equipped to implement.'"
F. Nexus Test
The final test that the Court uses is a nexus test. The nexus test
has been refined in recent cases but generally holds that for a gov-
ernment regulation not to exceed permissible bounds and become a
taking, it must promote a legitimate or substantial public purpose
through means that are reasonably or closely related to achieving that
12 See supra Part I.C.
ISO SeeNebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502,537-38 (1933); sce aLso cases cited supra note 14.
1 StevenJ. Eagle argues that the "natural home" for deciding whether a regulation's failure
to provide a reciprocity of advantage is the Takings Clause, not the Due Process Clause. See Ea-
gle, supra note 15, at 1007-09 (arguing that "substantive due process has a role in property'
rights jurisprudence that is separate from that of the takings clause). The analysis offered here
reaches the opposite condusion: considerations of fairness are appropriate only in a due proc-
ess analysis. Eagle implies also that the natural home for considerations of wlhether a property
use is a nuisance is not the Takings but the Due Process Clause, it. at 1007. whereas the analysis
offered here reaches the opposite conclusion, see supra Part I.C.
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purpose. 132 The level of scrutiny appropriate in applying this test has
been a matter of dispute. If the test were applied using a minimal
scrutiny rational basis test, then so long as the regulation was rea-
sonably related to the effectuation of a legitimate purpose it would be
valid, and most regulations can easily pass this test. But if stricter
scrutiny were used, requiring the regulation to be narrowly tailored
to the effectuation of a compelling state interest, which is to say at the
very least that the regulation adopted must be better than less restric-
tive alternatives, then many regulations would be declared compen-
sable takings.
The Court addressed the question of precisely how strict the
nexus test should be in Dolan v. City of Tigard.3 The city of Tigard
developed a code that required the petitioner, who had applied to
the city for a permit to expand her hardware store, to dedicate part of
her property for a green way adjoining and within a floodplain and to
provide land for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway, in
exchange for permit approval. The condition was intended to offset
the effects of further development of her property. Ms. Dolan ar-
gued that this regulation effected a taking of her property. The
Court applied a nexus test, asking whether the permit condition"substantially advances legitimate state interests.'33 Since the city had
not proved that its demands satisfied this test, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Oregon upholding the act was reversed and the
case remanded.
The importance of Dolan lies in its clarification of the nexus test,
which is now labeled the "essential nexus" test,' 36 apparently because
it is regarded as a decisive factor rather than as just one among many
considerations in an ad hoc inquiry. Chief'Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, declared that a minimal scrutiny nexus test that falls
back on "very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development" is
too "lax."i3 7 He also declared that a strict scrutiny nexus test that re-
quires the local government to "demonstrate that its exaction is di-
rectly proportional to the specifically created need" is too "exact-
132 See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 127 (arguing that "a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public pur-
pose"); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1986); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
133 For cases upholding economic regulations under minimal scrutiny, see supra note l14. In
Nollan, the Court, over Justice Brennan's dissent, distinguished the rational basis test used in
this line of cases and in equal protection cases from the test used in takings cases. '182 U.S. at
834 n.3 ("We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state in-terest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State could rationally have decided that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective.'") (citations omitted).
13 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
' Id. at 385.
13 1I at 386.
137 Id at 389.
[Vol. 3:3
CONSTITLrIONAL PROPERTY PRO7TIO.7NS
ing.""' Thus he developed what he regards as a suitable standard:
the rough proportionality test. It holds that "[nio precise mathe-
matical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.-'39
The ChiefJustice explicitly distinguishes this rough proportional-
ity standard from the "rational basis" test used in Equal Protection
Clause analysis,' just asJustice Scalia had done Nith tie nexus test in
its Nollan instantiation.4  But he does not make clear what the textual
basis for employing a nexus test is, if not a requirement of the Due
Process Clause. This is a problem requiring further attention. Use of
the nexus test is convincing only when our basis for using it can be
found in the Constitution's text and its underlying principles. Oth-
erwise the test is arbitrary, even if well-intentioned.
If the effect of a law is to physically take property or transfer prop-
erty rights from the private owner to the public, the fact that the law
is arbitrary or failed a minimal-scrutiny nexus test does not make the
law any more or less of a taking. If a law regulates property uses
without effecting a physical taking, the regulation would not become
a "taking" merely on the basis of its being arbitrary. However, if the
law is arbitrary, we can say it thereby deprives a person of property
without substantive due process of law. Appealing to the Due Process
Clause is, with one unimportant exception, the only intellectually co-
herent way to explain why a use-restriction failing either a minimal,
heightened, or strict scrutiny nexus test violates the Constitution."
There is one sense in which a nexus test would be appropriate in
deciding whether a law effects a "taking." And there are two distinct
ways in which a nexus test could be applied in a due process analysis.
A nexus test can be employed as part of a general substantive due
process analysis, as part of a special due process analysis applicable
only to property cases and associated with the principle of fairness,
and as part of a Takings Clause analysis, as a means of determining
whether a use restricted by the state is a noxious use.
A nexus test might be applied to determine whether a law violates
the requirements of substantive due process. Someone using this test
Id- at 390.
'9 Id. at 391.
140 Id
M Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825. 834 n.3 (1987) ('[There is no rctson to
believe ... that so long as the regulation of properY is at issue the standards for tikings chat-
lenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical ..
Glen E. Summers similarly argues that the substantial relations test, along ith the balan c-
ing test, are appropriate only in a due process analysis. S&e Summers. supra note 15, at 83-39,
880, 885 (supporting a means-ends test using stricter scrutiny for rcgulatonr takings under the
rubric of due process only where necessary to protect discrete and insular minoritiesi.
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might argue that property is a fundamental right"" and that the state
may deprive an individual of her right to property only with compel-
ling justification. Deprivations of property, on this reasoning, would
be subject to strict scrutiny of the legislative means and ends. The law
would have to be not merely rational or nonarbitrary but narrowly tai-
lored to the effectuation of a compelling government interest, which
is to say better than alternative, less restrictive laws the state might
have enacted. Someone using the nexus test as part of a substantive
due process analysis might also regard state regulations of property as
essentially economic regulations, which, according to a long line of
cases, are subject only to the minimal scrutiny rational basis test. Use
restrictions on property, on this view, would violate substantive due
process only if they were irrational or arbitrary. 41 In either case, the
constitutional rationale for the nexus test is to determine whether the
law deprives a person of property without due process of law.
There is another, conceptually distinct rationale for using a nexus
test in a due process analysis. In the above section on fairness,"* we
observed that laws enacted by a majority that single out and impose
an undue burden on some, or which fail to provide an "average reci-
procity of advantage," may violate the requirements of substantive
due process. Whether they do will depend in part on how scrupu-
lously fair laws must be in order to satisfy the demands of due proc-
ess. A nexus test can help to explain why a property owner is being
singled out by a regulation and to evaluate the fairness of the regula-
tion. In Penn Central46 and Miller v. Schoene'47 government regulations
passed even a strict scrutiny nexus test. In Penn Central, the Court
held that New York City did not take Penn Central's property when it
invoked its landmark preservation act to restrict Penn Central from
constructing an office building atop its own Grand Central Terminal;
the only way to address the legitimate interest of preserving Grand
Central Terminal was to deny the construction permit."8 The law
passes the strictest nexus test, but it passes the noxious use test only
on the most liberal understanding of noxious use. The law certainly
fails a strict-scrutiny noxious use test. But the fact that the law passes
the strict scrutiny nexus test is significant: it may justify singling out
Penn Central and suggest why imposing a greater burden on it may
not be unfair. In Miller, the Court ruled that requiring Miller to cut
down his cedar trees because they were carrying a fungus destructive
to neighboring apple orchards was a valid regulation and not a tak-
143 Early court cases and documents of the Founders and those who influenced them suggest
that property is regarded as a fundamental right. See Gold, supra note 10.144 See cases cited supra note 14.
145 See supra Part II.D.
146 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
147 276 U.S. 272 (1927).
148 Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 138.
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ing.'49 In each case, the regulation was narrowly tailored and perhaps
the only practical way to achieve the legitimate state interest. This
fact provides a convincing reason for singling out the property ownm-
ers. It was their present or proposed use of property that had to be
prevented if the state was to meet its objective, be it the realization of
a non-nuisance restraint public benefit (Penn Central) or the cessation
of a harm (Miller). In the former case, though, this may not provide a
convincing reason for making the owner bear the burden of the regu-
lation. One can argue convincingly that when one causes harm, the
price of ceasing the harm should be born only by the culprit, but
where the state seeks not to prevent a harm but to provide a non-
nuisance restraint benefit, the cost of obtaining this benefit should be
spread evenly.
A third purpose for invoking a nexus test, conceptually distinct
from the previous two, is to help determine whether a physical taking
meets the requirements of the noxious use exception. The strict
scrutiny noxious use test says that the state is justified in restricting
property without paying just compensation only if it is doing so to
prevent a noxious or harmful use of property. We have already dis-
cussed the underlying rationale for the test. We have also seen how it
is sometimes difficult to decide whether a use of property is noxious
and causes harm. If the state truly is justified in regulating property
to prevent a noxious use, then we should be able to say that the regu-
lation is substantially related, indeed necessary, for the effectuation of
a compelling state interest. If a law cannot pass the nexus test, it
cannot pass the noxious use test. If the Court is having difficulty de-
ciding whether the law passes the noxious use test, it might turn to
the nexus test to help decide this. For example, in Miller the only fea-
sible way to save the apple orchards was to cut down Miller's trees; the
regulation passes the nexus test, and this supports the judgment that
the law is restricting a noxious use. On the other hand, in Lucas it
would be difficult to say that the legitimate state interest in preserving
the beaches and endangered species could only be achieved by pre-
venting Lucas and those similarly situated from building permanent
structures on their property. If the regulation would fail a nexus test,
this would support the judgment that the law is not restricting a nox-
ious use. This use of a nexus test will do little that can not already be
done through a strict scrutiny noxious use test, and as a practical mat-
ter, on the decoupling approach the nexus test has no important role
in applying the Takings Clause.
14 Miler, 276 U.S. at 279-81.
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CONCLUSION
In current takings adjudication the Court relies on numerous
considerations, often without linking them to a principled interpreta-
tion of the Constitution's text. The Court considers whether the lo-
cal law in question denies a property owner economically viable use
without recognizing that there are distinct reasons why denial of eco-
nomically viable use would be relevant to the constitutional issue.
The Court considers whether the law is preventing a "noxious use" of
property without recognizing that there are distinct reasons why the
fact that a law prevents a noxious use would be constitutionally rele-
vant. The Court considers whether the property owner is being un-
fairly singled out, or whether the law secures an average reciprocity of
advantage, without explaining the textual basis in the Constitution
for a requirement that laws be fair, without acknowledging that there
are different degrees of fairness, and without explaining which de-
gree is required by the Constitution. The Court considers whether
investment-backed expectations have been frustrated by the law with-
out acknowledging that there are different reasons for why this con-
sideration would be relevant to principled constitutional analysis. Fi-
nally, the Court considers whether the law passes a nexus test without
recognizing that there are at least three different ways in which a
nexus test can be linked to a constitutional requirement.
The Court has defended its approach, despite charges that the
approach is "muddled," on the grounds that an ad hoc analysis is ap-
propriate, because property rights issues are complicated and require
attention to particular factual settings. But one can defend an analy-
sis that takes into account the rich and complex details of a factual
setting while also criticizing the unprincipled use of textually tin-
grounded considerations in approaching this factual setting.
There are two practical implications of decoupling the Takings
and Due Process Clauses. First, for a regulation that does not physi-
cally take property but which nevertheless deprives a person of prop-
erty without due process, the Court, on the decoupling approach,
would have to find that the regulation violates not the Takings Clause
but the relevant Due Process Clause (for a federal regulation, the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; for a state or local regula-
tion, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). The consti-
tutional remedy for such a violation would not necessarily be just
compensation, unless the Court were to decide that by providing just
compensation a regulation could thereby overcome due process ob-
jections. Since there is little reason for holding that just compensa-
tion provides an adequate remedy for the enactment of arbitrary, un-
fair, or unwise laws restricting the use or value of private property,
then on the decoupling approach proposed here governments may
simply be prohibited from enacting some of the laws that they are
permitted to enact under current takings adjudication so long as they
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provide compensation to the affected property owners. Second, the
decoupling approach should force Justices who defend property
rights by regarding restrictions on use as compensable takings but
who also oppose the doctrine of substantive due process to reconcile
what, on the view espoused here, is an incoherent constitutional ju-
risprudence.
